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PHOTOGRAPHER'S RIGHTS: CASE FOR
SUFFICIENT ORIGINALITY TEST IN
COPYRIGHT LAW
PATRICIA L. BAADE*

INTRODUCTION
'Origination' versus 'originality,'1 as standards used to justify
granting exclusive rights to sell or reproduce new products and
creations, have competed for legal force throughout the history of
intellectual property law. While patent law used the Hotchkiss'
standard of 'originality' for over a century to qualify inventions for
a patent, copyright law set no such standards. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in Lee v. Runge,3 argued that "copyrightability" should
apply to copyright as patentability applies to patents because "the
constitutional power over copyrights is found in the same clause
that governs the issuance of patents."4 Justice Douglas further argued that:
No reason can be offered why we should depart from the plain import of this grant of congressional power and apply more lenient
constitutional standards to copyrights than to patents. Indeed ...
a copyright may have to meet greater constitutional standards for
* Ms. Baade studied intellectual property law at the University of Virginia Law School. She is a former gallery owner and dealer in fine art photography. This Article is based on a previous work by the author, PATRICIA
BAADE, GUIDE TO CASELAW IN COPYRIGHT: PHOTOGRAPHY (1996), available
from Foto-Galerie, P.O. Box 4706, Charlottesville, Va. 22905.
1. The contrast between these two terms is a matter of degree: the first
means to merely "bring into being." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1277 (3d ed. 1993). Originality is "[tihe quality of being original."
Id. Original is defined as "[preceding all others in time; not derived from
something else; fresh and unusual." Id. at 1276.
2. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850). The Court invalidated Hotchkiss' patent for lack of "invention," reasoning as follows:
Unless more ingenuity and skill ... were required ... than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there
was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement
is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.
Id. at 267.
3. 404 U.S. 887 (1971).
4. Id. at 888 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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validity than a patent. The limitations set forth in Graham v. John
Deere Co., [383 U.S. 1 (1966)] therefore, apply with at least equal.
force to copyrights. 5
Naturally, court opinions on the issue of originality have
ranged widely and produced inconsistent results. Since the Copyright Act of 1976,6 principles of both property and contract law
guide most courts in settling disputes over rights to copy. The
value of fine art and its copyrightability, unlike that of commercial
work, derives not only from ownership rights to the art object or
from reproduction rights to the subject depicted, in the case of
commissioned works, but also from the creative expression unique
to its maker.
The cases surveyed in the author's GUIDE TO CASELAW IN
COPYRIGHT: PHOTOGRAPHY 7 show a variety of approaches to analyzing originality in copyrighted expression in photography generally. Rights to control the reproduction and dissemination of
photographic images depend on which of three faces of the copyright the court will focus on: the photograph, the subject photographed, or the photographer. Rights to the object photograph can
be preserved under property law; rights of the subject or owner of
the subject photographed can be preserved under contract law;
and all other work, in the absence of contract or property rights of
others, is controlled by the photographer who created the image.
To the degree that the photographer's expression is creative and is
his own discovery, the constitutional mandate provides for exclusive rights to those authors and inventors. All other work belongs
in the public domain. Most. courts surveyed here deemed expression to be the equivalent of authorship and, failed to validate the
photographs at issue for originality, as measured by aesthetics.
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the question several
times whether all photography, artistic straight photography as
well as documentary or commercial works, qualifies for copyright
protection. Judge Wyatt, in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis,8 traced
the history of those decisions and found a variety of opinions on
this issue. In Burrow-GilesLithographic Co. v. Sarony,9 the Court
distinguished portraiture, the genre of the disputed work, from
"the ordinary production of a photograph," which, in Judge Wyatt's

5. Id. at 890 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (citations omitted)).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
7. PATRicIA L. BAADE, GUIDE TO CASELAW IN COPYRIGHT: PHOTOGRAPHY
(1996).
8. 293 F. Supp. 130, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
9. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
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opinion, "left open whether an ordinary photograph of a real life
0
object could constitutionally be a proper subject of copyright."
Judge Wyatt also noted that in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.," the Court found it "obvious" that the result could not be
affected by the fact that the pictures represented "actual groups visible things" and that such pictures "drawn from the life" [as opposed to a 'composed' subject] could be copyrighted. In this connection the Bleistein Court declared: "Others are free to copy the
The least preoriginal. They are not free to copy the copy ....
and the
than
directories
in
it
tentious picture has more originality
12
like, which may be coyrighted."
Consistent with Bleistein, Judge Learned Hand, in Jewelers
Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 3 reasoned
that:
[N]o photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal
influence of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike ...
photographs are protected without regard to the degree of
'personality' which enters into them. At least there has been no
case since 1909 in which that has been held to be a condition. The
might not include all photographs
suggestion that the Constitution
4
seems to me overstrained.1
Finally, on the other hand, Judge Wyatt noted the dissenting
opinion of Justice Brandeis in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,5 wherein Justice Brandeis, separating artistic from
routine documentary photography, stated that the "mere record of
isolated happenings, whether in words or by photographs not involving artistic skill, are denied [copyright]'protection.""' Although
Judge Wyatt recognized that the Jewelers opinion might be the
prevailing view at that time, he found that the particular photographs at issue in Time Inc. did not qualify for copyright because
they lacked expressive content and artistic composition.' In the
10. Time Inc., 293 F. Supp. at 141 (citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56).

Photography did not receive copyright protection until 1865, or 26 years after
invention of the process. In Altman v. New Haven Union Co., the court reaffirmed this law. 254 F. 113 (D. Conn. 1918). The court noted "whether [a] photographer is an author, and a photograph a writing, within the constitutional
provision under which copyrights may be granted, [the] constitutionality of the
[Act of March 3, 1865] was sustained." Id. at 117 (citations omitted).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
12. Time Inc., 293 F. Supp. at 141 (citing Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50).
13. 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
14. Id. at 934..
15. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
16. Id. at 254 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17. Time Inc., 293 F. Supp. at 142-44 (referring to the Abraham Zapruder
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more recent court decisions from the 1980s and 1990s that will be
examined here, the artistic/non-artistic criteria for copyright set
forth in Time Inc. was largely ignored.
Photography as a medium of artistic expression is not unlike
a novel. Although there have been relatively few cases that turned
on photographers' artistic rights to copyrighted photographs, it is
well worth pausing to consider those cases that have arisen, and
how the courts have addressed the problem of discerning originality in expression in straight photography. The issues one confronts here parallel those found in validating copyright protection
in fiction and nonfiction. A fine line exists between fiction and
nonfiction. Whereas authors of the former enjoy broad protection
under copyright law comparable to free speech, protection for the
latter grows increasingly thin. An especially dangerous trend
emerges among copyrighted 'factual' works where courts fail to
discern the difference between theoretical or propositional works
that try to describe our world more completely, and other commercial works that trivialize facts and ideas. The same blurring of
the line between creative straight photography and documentary
commercial work is found in the cases examined for this article.
Creative straight photography, like nonfictional academic and
scientific work, is closer to philosophy than it is to art. It is work
based on a belief system, circumstantial evidence, deduction, necessarily lonely and tedious, but, more important for the rest of the
world, the explorer producing these works is driven to know what
he does not know. The comments made about this kind of photography apply with equal force to copyright protection of both academic and scientific work. The intent and purpose of this kind of
work is wholly different from fictional art work in photography or
novels, but every bit as creative. It is equally different from nonfictional documentary and commercial works in photography, but
every bit as precise and incisive. Though courts know it is not art
in the manipulated, fictional sense, many courts have yet to realize that creative straight photography is not nonfiction either, like
commercial works found in newsprint and advertising, where
skills in the craft apply mostly and where personal expression
must be set aside to deliver a specified product. Conversely, most
commercial work lacks that degree of creativity found in great,
straight art photography.
While commercial work has demonstrable market value and
property value, thus making it the most common type of photography at issue in court, on grounds of originality alone-and the
courts need go no further-the author will argue, most commercial
pictures of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy).

Photographer'sRights
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work does not qualify for copyright protection.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR COPYRIGHT

The Congress shall have Power ...To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"
Originality, though subtle and harder to define than origination, deserves to be recognized uniformly according to predictable
standards in order to fulfill the constitutional mandate. Were
there to be a standard written into copyright law, comparable to
patent law, 9 but closer to the Hotchkiss standard," straight fine
art photography 2 would pass, whereas most other photography
would fail. Although in Lee v.Runge,' Justice Douglas argued
that applying the nonobviousness standard of patent law's § 103
would not "invalidate the copyright in the substantial portion of all
literary works, where novelty as distinguished from originality is a
very rare commodity,"' while others have argued a novelty standard would eliminate copyright protection for many useless works.
The Framers of the Constitution provided a constitutional
mandate for Congress to grant patents and copyrights to "Authors
and Inventors" for "Writings and Discoveries" to protect the individual's exclusive right to sell his work and insure a continuous
flow of ideas. In exchange for these exclusive rights, according to
this mandate, the would-be author or inventor must demonstrate a
contribution to "Science and useful Arts." In qualifying a "simple"
photograph for copyright protection under the mandate Gorman
explains:
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

19. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). In order to receive a patent, an invention must not
have been anticipated or have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the
art to which the invention pertains. Id.
20. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the Hotchkiss standard.
21. The Author defines straight fine art photography broadly to include not
only that work produced by artists who sell and publish, but also some memorable exceptions from commercial or documentary work, produced with signature style or in a "highly distinctive manner." Examples of the latter include:
Irving Penn and Richard Avedon (advertising); Edward Steichen and August
Sander (portraiture); Henri Cartier-Bresson and Robert Capa (documentary
work). See generally JOHN SZARKOWSKI, LOOKING AT PHOTOGRAPHS: ONE
HUNDRED PICTURES FROM THE COLLECTION OF THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART

(1973).
22. 404 U.S. 887 (1971).

23. Id. at 891 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 33 (1971), though noting that Professor Nimmer
might have retracted somewhat from this view).
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Another reason for granting copyright protection to the simple photograph is the familiar saw which tells us that one picture is worth
a thousand words. If it can be as instructive as a lengthily written
description of the same scene, a photograph advances our knowledge of the useful arts and sciences, and enhances our understanding of historical occurrences and natural events, just as much as
does the written description.24
The Copyright Act of 197625 codifies the development of common law in copyright throughout this century. The authority to
determine the statutory boundaries of copyright is vested in Congress, and it is within these boundaries that intellectual property
owners may gain or lose copyright protection. According to the
1976 Act, creative expression becomes "intellectual property," once
it is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression., 26 The Act measures the value of intellectual property by its value in the market
place, as encoded in the Fair Use doctrine. 27 The value of commercial work is relatively easy to measure this way, but artistic
work is measured differently.
Even in early cases such as Folsom v. March,28 the Court declined to recognize exclusive rights for authors under copyright
law.29 Writing for the Court, Justice Story described the test for
Fair Use as a measure of injury to the plaintiff, stating that "[i]f so
much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an

24. Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1597-98 (1963). See also Stephen
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 HARv. L. REV. 281 (1970) (arguing that a
standard of nonobviousness would not disserve the interests underlying
copyright power).
25. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1994).
26. Id. § 102. In Altman v. New Haven Union Co., 254 F. 113 (D. Conn.
1918), the court, in the context of discussing 'fixing' expression, noted that:
[The photographer] did all of the work necessary to secure a proper
negative, from which an acceptable photograph can be made, and which
resulted in a pleasing, satisfactory, and, so far as such a production may
be, an artistic photograph, at least sufficiently so as to bring it within
the realm of those things which may be copyrighted.
Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
27. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-20. The courts are required to weigh four factors of fair
use: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Id. § 107.
28. 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
29. Id. at 348-49.
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injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, in
point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto.
In Time Inc.,"
Judge Wyatt distinguished Fair Use of the patentee from that of
the copyright owner, stating that "[u]nlike the owner of a patent
(35 U.S.C. § 154), the owner of a copyright is not given by statute
(17 U.S.C. § 1) any exclusive right to use the work.""
Fair Use doctrine has been considered in three recent Supreme Court decisions: Stewart v. Abend,3" Harper& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,' and Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc.." In the recent copyright infringement cases
under discussion here, the courts relied on these decisions to
varying degrees which affected the results. Relying primarily on
Stewart and Sony, the district court in Rogers v. Koons," defined
Fair Use doctrine as an "equitable rule of reason ... which permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute
when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that
law is designed to foster.37 However, with reference to Harper,another New York district court in Caratzasv. Time Life, Inc., 8 noted
that Fair Use doctrine favors plaintiffs where, regardless of the
amount used, the portion used is "essentially the heart" of the
copyrighted work. 9
In applying Fair Use doctrine, the 'heart' of creative expression,
cannot be 'fixed,' as it were, the same as for commercial works.
The value of creative, innovative products varies with the audience
or the times or context in which the product is consumed. Some
artistic work may not have material value for a long time after its
creation but it may have intangible value as a window-on-theworld, expanding knowledge of the world that can lead to other
discoveries. The value of a work, with respect to copyright protection for the artist or creator, depends on how the court interprets
the word 'progress' in the constitutional mandate. 'Progress' in the
sense of 'more is better,' with its wide array of material gadgets,
quite often serves to separate the individual from experiencing life
in a meaningful way. 'Progress' in the sense of discovery and expanding knowledge is, without exception, worth protecting.

30. Id. at 348.
31. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
32. Id. at 144.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

495 U.S. 207 (1990).
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Id. at 479 (citations omitted).

38. No. CIV. CIV. 92-6346, 1992 WL 322033 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1992).

39. Id. at *8.
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Unlike patent law, the federal court decisions examined here seldom measured copyrightability by the second, intangible standard
of 'progress,' but were guided instead by property and contractual
rights. In those infringement cases where pre-existing copyrighted material had been used, copyright owners were not required to show improvement over the pre-existing work, only that
the work belonged to them. The Rogers appellate court decision,4°
for example, described the present day standard of 'originality'
as if it meant 'origination' so that it does not count for much: "The
quantity of originality that need be shown is modest-only a dash
of it will do." 2 Unfortunately, applying such a low copyrightability
standard for creative work, at issue in this case, leaves some work
dealing with 'facts' unprotected, while it protects other, obvious
work which does not deserve copyright protection.
II. THREE FACES OF COPYRIGHT
In CONTESTED CULTURE,4" Jane M. Gaines outlined three
analogies that were drawn initially by the Court in Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.44 The first is between photographers
and painters, the second between photographs and prints, and
third, the subjects photographed and 'Writings' to find photography worthy of copyright, stating that the "American theorization of
original artistry in the photograph ...

is the product of the con-

vergence of at least three analogies: the written composition, the
painted canvas, and the printed lithograph."45 Thus, photography
received copyright protection because the Court analogized it to
fine art." Some may argue Sarony's photograph was commercial
work, but that particular portrait was not of that ilk. The photograph communicated a message from the photographer that went
40. See, e.g., Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,
345 (1991).
The sine qua non of copyright is originality ... [which] means only
that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal
degree of creativity .... To be sure, the requisite level of creativity extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
Id. (Emphasis added). The statement appears early in the opinion in the context of explaining why factual compilations are generally not copyrightable.
41. See supra note 1 for the definition of 'originality' and 'origination.'
42. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (paraphrasing loosely
Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991)).
43. JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE

LAW (1991).
44. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
45. GAINES, supra note 43, at 54.
46. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.
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beyond merely depicting a personage.
In copyright litigation over time, courts shifted focus from
those early cases about the rights of the photographer/artist," to
cases about property rights of the owner of the photograph, 8 Work
for Hire" and Fair Use' cases, then shifted focus for a third time
in post-Feist decisions, to what was photographed, construing 'fact'
from 'idea,' and using the "modest" standard of originality. 5' The
shift in copyright law from protecting the expression of the artist
to protecting intellectual property can be traced back to Pushman
v. New York Graphic Society."' There, the court held that the
rights of reproduction passed with the sale of a painting." The
court further stated that in order to retain reproduction rights, an
artist would have to expressly provide for such a right. ' Even before Pushman, the artist's "exclusive right" to control reproduction
of his copyrighted work had been eroded for portraiture works,
vesting reproduction rights with the sitter, unless the photograph
was made at the expense of the photographer." The Copyright Act
of 1976 expressly took away artists' "exclusive Right" in the constitutional mandate by permitting the use of a copyrighted work
within certain limits" and by denying the presumption of copyright
ownership for "Authors and Inventors" in the Work for Hire provision. 7
Most of the recent copyright decisions involving photography
47. See generally id.; Altman v. New Haven Union Co., 254 F. 113 (D.

Conn. 1918).
48. See generally Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130

(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Chamberlain v. Feldman, 89 N.E.2d 863 (N.Y. 1949); Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., 39 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1942).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994). For a discussion of commissioned work see
Schatt v. Curtis Management Group, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

For a discussion of employee work see Marco v. Accent Publ'g Co., No.
CIV.A.91-2057, 1991 WL 212187 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1991).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
51. See supra notes 40-42 for a discussion of the originality standard.
52. 39 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1942).

53. Id. at 251.
54. Id.
55. Altman, 254 F. at 118. In Altman, the court stated:

Where the photographer takes the portrait for the sitter under employment by the latter, it is the implied agreement that the property in
the portrait is in the sitter, and neither the photographer nor a stranger
has a right to print or make copies without permission from the sitter.
Where, however, the photograph is taken at the expense of the photographer and for his benefit, the sitter loses control of the disposition of
the pictures, and the property right is in the photographer.
Id. (citations omitted).
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
57. Id. § 201 (b).
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concern commercial work, guided by commercial values, in applying Fair Use and Work for Hire areas of the law. Several, recent
cases involving different kinds of photography will be examined.
These cases fall under two kinds of infringement disputes. In the
first group, the defendant admits copying but denies infringement
on grounds of an invalid copyright for the plaintiffs work. In the
second group, the defendant denies copying more than is permitted under Fair Use.
In connection with common law and statutory law eroding
artists' constitutional rights, this Article examines the use of an
Ordinary Observer' standard in copyright validation tests and
copying tests under the Merger doctrine." In copyright infringement cases, the validity of the copyright can be challenged for
Sufficient Originality ° by invoking Merger doctrine. A defendant
may claim the work at issue is devoid of originality and monopolizes abstract ideas, themes or plots. Merger doctrine may also be
used as an affirmative defense under Fair Use in a test of Substantial Similarity,' if the subject matter of the copyrighted work
58. Courts differ in applying the Ordinary Observer test. Part One of the
Two-Step Sufficient Originality test is an extrinsic test: "the ordinary observer,
unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them,
and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). The Ordinary Observer test
of the Two-Part Substantial Similarity test questions whether the copying would
be noticed generally, thus making itan intrinsic test between two works. Ideal
Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966).
59. Under fair use, Merger doctrine is defined as "expression is not protected
in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea
that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the idea
itself." BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d
1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1101 (1994) (citations omitted). Merger doctrine under a sufficient originality test is defined as
.similarities ...not sufficient to preclude coincidence since (1) there [is] no resemblance to the ear of the lay listener and/or (2) the plaintiffs contribution [is]
too banal." Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 475 (2d Cir. 1946).
60. To be valid, copyright protection of 'authored' work has always required
Sufficient Originality. To what degree, however, is not a settled question. The
Feist decision teaches authoring alone is not enough. See generally Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). A-Sufficient Originality
test was first articulated as a test for illicit copying in Arnstein v. Porter. 154
F.2d at 468. It is a Two-Step test, separating copying from illicit copying. Thus,
direct copying may be permitted under common law fair use if two works are
extrinsically different or if the copied work lacks Sufficient Originality.
61. The Two-Part test to discern Substantial Similarity between two works at
issue calls for "substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of the expressions of those ideas as well." Curtis v. General Dynamics Corp., 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1615 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Tel. Prod.,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977)). The Curtiscourt.
further stated that, "[i]n reviewing the copyrighted work against the infringing

1996]

1 Photographer'sRights

is very common and certain similarities cannot be avoided.62 A
Sufficient Originality test for copyright validation is still good
law,' but the author argues that it was misconstrued in Krofft v.
McDonald's Corp." and thereafter, fell into disuse.
The two legal tests for illicit copying, Substantial Similarity (a
Two-Part test) and Sufficient Originality (a Two-Step test), rely on
an Ordinary Observer judgment and on application of the Merger
doctrine, though from different perspectives. The first test presumes expression to be equivalent to the ideas or facts depicted in
the disputed work, while the second test evaluates expression for
meaning, and facts depicted are not necessarily equivalent to the
idea. The first test is intrinsic, comparing the properties or concrete parts of the works at issue, while the second is extrinsic,
comparing the attributes of each whole work and, as against all
other works of its kind. The post-Feist decisions seem unduly focused on the subject matter photographed, literally, as the Substantial Similarity test is applied. In general, these courts applied
this infringement test without regard to function equivalency between works.
Based on the cases reviewed, unless raised at the outset of a
case, together with an admission of copying, Sufficient Originality
tests were subsumed under the Fair Use doctrine. In these cases,
quite often infringement suits never went beyond a Substantial
Similarity test for copying, either because of denials and a subsequent finding of Substantial Similarity between the works at issue, followed by summary judgment, or property rights of the
owner controlled reproduction, and thus preempted application of
the Merger doctrine defense under Fair Use.6" In order to be
heard, a Sufficient Originality defense must be raised at the beginning of the, suit under a motion to dismiss."
Currently, there is no requirement to specify function or intended use of a copyrighted work on the copyright registration
form. Not unlike fraudulent infringement claims in patent law becopy, the court is allowed to dissect the similarities between the images, but not

the dissimilarities." Id. at 1616..

62. Pictures of famous historical landmarks would be an example of situations where the work is common and similarities are inevitable.
63. See generally Feist Publications,499 U.S. 340; Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc., v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Mathieson v. Assoc. Press, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d 1685 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
64. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
65. See generally Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Epic Metals
v. Condec, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
66. See generally Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). In Arnstein, the court never reached the illicit copying issue because the plaintiffs
contribution was too banal. Id. at app. at 475.
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fore the Patent Act of 1870 required patentees to declare specifications of their claim, 7 after a copyrighted work is copied the
copyright owner often enlarges the scope of his intended, albeit
unwritten, claim. For commercial photography, terms of the contract generally limit the purpose and use of the image and could
just as well serve as evidence of specifications of the copyright.
Even though most photographs at issue in lawsuits are commissioned or commercial in nature, the courts accept evidence of a
registered copyright in place of a copyright validation test, and inquire no further about Sufficient Originality of the disputed work.
More often than not, commercial photography produces generic
documents which are not actually distinguishing for any discovery
in the art, even though the images may be unique for some narrow
use or function. The constitutional mandate seeks to encourage
discoveries found in creative expression, not just expression like
free speech. To this end, the author argues for a greater emphasis
on a Sufficient Originality test.
A

Idea-Fact/ExpressionDichotomy

The Copyright Act of 1976 prohibits copyrighting facts and
ideas generally." Throughout copyright law, there is a broad, general prohibition against copyrighting what is already in the public
domain. Courts interpret this prohibition as applying to broad
concepts such as algorithms and pre-existing common knowledge.
The prohibition however does not encompass, copyrighting original
"Writings and Discoveries." The author contends, moreover, that
the 1990 amendment to § 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Law, read
broadly to include original discoveries, is unconstitutional.
A brief review of the case law in the development of separating public domain knowledge from original discoveries in copy67. See generally Winnans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853). In

Winnans, the Court enlarged the scope of patentee's claims because use of the
invention for which it was intended did not depend on its form. Id. at 344.
The Court held,
[w]here form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look at form
only. Where they are separable; where the whole substance of the invention may be copied in a different form, it is the duty of the courts

and juries to look through the form for the substance of the inventionfor that which entitled the inventor to his patent, and which the patent
was designed to secure ....
Id. at 343. See infra notes 259-60 accompanying text for a discussion of reverse doctrine of equivalents.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodies in such work.." Id.
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righted works follows. The legal concept is referred to generally as
the idea/expression dichotomy. This review shows that in the past,
courts eliminated broad concepts or pre-existing raw data from the
scope of copyright protection. In contrast, post-Rogers courts
seem to have applied the copyright law69 indiscriminately to invalidate copyright of factual depiction or description of any kind
and in any kind of photograph or writing. The Author expands
'idea-fact/expression dichotomy' to highlight this latest development.
Idea-fact/expression dichotomy, with respect to the Merger
doctrine, evolved over the past century beginning with BurrowGiles Lithographic,Inc. v.Sarony.70 In Burrow-Giles Lithographic,
the Court found that artistic expression could be separated and
described as input to the product itself.7' It was, in fact, the quality of originality in the work that made it worthy of copyright protection. After Burrow-Giles, another copyright validity challenge
came before the Court in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co.7 2 In Bleistein, Justice Holmes remarked in support of modest
artistic expression found in the advertising posters at issue before
the Court: "[o]thers are free to copy the original. They are not free
to copy the copy."" The Court defined "to copy" in terms of what
motivated it: "the personal reaction of an individual upon nature."74 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan argued that the infringed work lacked original artistic design, thus lacking
"intrinsic" value, and could not function to promote the useful
arts.7
Subsequently, in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
Judge Learned Hand distinguished that which was in the public
domain, and that which must be original, but not necessarily new.
In so doing, he reasoned that the copyright did not protect the
"broader outline of the plot."" Rather, only that part that originated with the author was protected."8 The infringer in that case
had taken literally Justice Holmes' invitation to copy. Judge Hand
explained "[i]f the copyrighted work is ... original, the public
demesne is important only on the issue of infringement ... [ilf
69. Id.
70. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
71. Id. at 60.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

188 U.S. 239 (1903).
Id. at 249.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 301 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
Id. at 54.

78. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[30:149

the defendant has had access to other material which would have
served him as well, his disclaimer becomes more plausible."79 Historical material, which is "of necessity what events have made it"8°
could be drawn from freely, for example.
81 decided some ten years after Sheldon, deArnstein v. Porter,
scribed the test for infringement by using two procedural steps:
Step One, asked whether there was "copying," and Step Two,
asked whether that copying constituted "illicit copying," or improper appropriation." In the first part of Step One, copying may
be determined by an admission or by circumstantial evidence such
as access. 83 If copying is denied but there are similarities,
"analysis [intrinsic comparison] is relevant, and the testimony of
experts may be received to aid the trier of fact."84 Absent evidence
of access, the similarities must be "so striking as to preclude the
possibility ... [of] independently arriv[ing] at the same result."85If
copying is striking, the second part of Step One of the inquiry applies. The court separates that which was already in the public
domain from that part which was original to the copyrighted work
at issue. To the extent reasonable minds may differ on what part
is original and therefore protected, again, expert opinions may be
used, depending on the complexity of the objects. After filtering
out the unprotected part of the work, what remains is then examined for illicit copying, an extrinsic test contrasting one work to
the other, under Step Two. The response of the "ordinary lay
hearer"8 determines whether that protected original part of the
expression, the 'heart,' was copied. This is an intuitive test in
which "dissection" and expert testimony become irrelevant. 7
In Greenbie v. Noble, 88 historical biography was added to the
list of noncopyrightable material "unless transformed by the first
taker."" The court further stated that generally, "[t]here is no
copyright of facts, news or history."9°
79. Id.
80. Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir.
1938).
81. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).

82. Id. at 468.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The case concerned copyrighted music. Any other source of intuitive
sense perception may be substituted for "hearer," depending on the copyrighted
object at issue.
87. Id.
88. 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
89. Id. at 65.
90. Id. at 66.
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A lengthy discussion of common law "fair use" doctrine appeared in Rosemont Enterprises,Inc. v.Random House Inc.."1 The
court repudiated the Oxford Book holding that "absolutely precluded" an author from using copyrighted ideas and facts developed from independent research. 92 Weighed against the public interest and the nature of the material, reasonable copying, not
"extensive verbatim copying or paraphrasing" could be considered
fair use.93 In Gardnerv.Nizer, the defendants asserted the fair use
doctrine as an affirmative defense concerning their use of two nonfiction works on the lives of two individuals. ' Though the historical
and biographical facts in the public domain were "necessarily
similar in content," the court declared that the author's expository
techniques, if original, were protected.95 The factual nature of the
works precluded the finding of substantial copying.96 Style and
form were compared intrinsically for verbatim copying, but not for
overall effect or message.
Concerning competing fictional works, the court in Fuld v.
National Broadcasting Co., reasoned that "it is impossible to
copyright historical facts or fictional material previously published
by others." 7 Note, however, that the themes at issue in Fuld were
abstract ideas, and the copyright owner sought monopoly on expository techniques like flashbacks, not the plot itself.9 The court
dissected the parts of the works and found copying, though only of
abstract ideas and general themes. Applying the "ordinary lay observer test" to reach this holding, as outlined in Arnstein's Step
One, each work, as a whole, was compared for effect, conveyance,
and purpose.
Arnstein v. Porter was resurrected in the Ninth Circuit although substantially changed in Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Production,Inc. v. McDonald's Corp." Krofft presented a new twopart test formula to measure Substantial Similarity. ' "° Though
claiming Arnstein as its model, the Two-Part test established in
Krofft differs from the Two-Step test presented in Arnstein. °1 Arn91. 366 F.2d 303, 306-10 (2d Cir. 1966).
92. Id. at 310.
93. Id.
94. 391 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The two individuals were Julius and
Ethel Ronsenberg.
95. Id. at 942.
96. Id. at 943.
97. 390 F. Supp. 877, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
98. Id. at 881-82.
99. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
100. See id. at 1163-69.
101. There are major differences between the Krofft Two-Part test and the
Arnstein Two-Step procedure in measuring infringement. The following is a
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stein's model works because it can accommodate both fiction and
nonfiction, broadly defined, as well as the absolute property value
and relative intangible value of creative works. The model established by Krofft fails to separate out expression borrowed from the
public domain from that which is original to the Author. When, in
Krofft's Part Two test, content is dissected under illicit copying,
the formal, relative differences between the works are never examined. Thus, the Two-Step procedure outlined in Arnstein allows
the "ordinary lay hearer" to detect copying of protected original
brief analysis of the more important distinctions.
1. Krofft's Two-Part Test may only be compared with Step One of the
Two-Step procedure of Arnstein. Arnstein's Part Two-Step One is a test for
how much of the work is already known to be part of common knowledge and
how much is original. It is, in effect, a novelty test and a test to measure a
given work's contribution to "Science and the useful Arts."
2. Krofft's Two-Part test measures "substantial similarity" while Arnstein's Step One-Part Two measures "sufficient originality." The distinction
between "substantial similarity" or "sufficient originality" is one of focus. The
Krofft court placed greater importance on material taking, while the Arnstein
court cared more about finding adequate originality to justify enforcement of
the copyright claim. Equity depends on striking a balance between creative
input and useful production.
3. Krofft's "idea-fact/expression" concept renders the facts and ideas in a
copyrighted work copyable by others, by defining 'idea' concretely, or as the
equivalent of the fixed expression. Arnstein's model defines idea as an abstract. Arnstein recognizes part of idea comes from the public domain and
part of it comes from the author.
4. Krofft's Two-Part test is two-dimensional, black and white, all fact.
Arnstein's Two-Step procedure is three-dimensional, with shadings of gray, a
mixture of fact and intuition.
5. Krofft defines 'dichotomy' as a reflection, the idea being the equivalent
of expression. Arnstein's concept of dichotomy is like a two-sided coin with
the idea being the flip-side of expression.
6. Part One of Krofft's test claims to be "extrinsic" because "it depends not
on the responses of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed
and analyzed... and expert testimony is appropriate." Krofft, 562 F.2d at
1164. Krofft dissects parts of the work, not of the whole, and it is therefore
not extrinsic, but intrinsic, by definition.
7. Krofft uses the term 'general ideas' to mean overall impression. Arnstein used 'general ideas' to mean those in the public domain.
8. Krofft's Part One is equivalent to the first half of Arnstein's Step One.
Both courts agree that this first part is a factual matter but one that may be
decided as a matter of law. The second half of Arnstein's Step One is equivalent to Krofft's Part Two: both tests dissect the works for similarities, but in
Krofft, the task is to look at the manner of expression generally for similarities between two works, as would an "ordinary reasonable person." This is
still an analytical exercise, but at the level of general impression, a subjective
view.
9. The second half of Arnstein's Step One, on the other hand, is an alternative procedure only if copying is denied. Given a denial, dissecting the
works becomes necessary, equivalent to Krofft, Part Onq.
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expression between works as wholes, while the Krofft version tests
for copying substantial parts of the manner of expression, whether
the ideas are original or drawn from the public domain. Krofft
presumes manner of expression must be unique to every person,
while prohibiting protection of ideas, be they original or not.
In Hoehling v. Universal Studios, Inc.' the Second Circuit
held that protection for an author's interpretation of certain historical facts is "not copyrightable as a matter of law." °3 The court
reasoned that in order to "avoid a chilling effect on authors who
contemplate tackling an historical issue or event, broad latitude
must be granted to subsequent authors who make use of historical
subject matter, including theories or plots."'"
Though the
Hoehling court noted that other circuits recognized protection of
original research, '0 5 it reaffirmed the view of the Second Circuit
that an author should not be "absolutely precluded from saving
time and effort by referring to and relying upon prior published
material. ,,1o6
Following the Hoehling decision, the court in Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp.10 7 confronted copyright violations in the
context of commercial designs, or 'nonfiction' in the broad sense,
and relied in part on Krofft.'0 ° Unlike the concrete analysis of plane
and shape found in Krofft, Durham did not dissect the intrinsic
similarities because both of the works at issue were generic variations on a common theme.'0 9 As such, it was inevitable that copying would be found, but not substantialcopying because originality
was lacking. Because the plaintiff owned the copyright registration and maintained a property right to control copying, it became
necessary to look beyond dissecting intrinsic properties of the
work."' Thus, the court focused upon function and effect and
found no substantial copying."' In the marketplace of ideas, as the
Durham case illustrates, two works may look the same yet be sufficiently different in function to compete without loss of profits to
102. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
103. Id. at 978.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 979 (citing Toksvig v. Bruce Publications Corp., 181 F.2d 664 (7th
Cir. 1950); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla.
1978)).
106. Id. (citing Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303
(2d Cir. 1966); Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688 (2d
Cir. 1938)).
107. 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. Id. at 909.
109. Id. at 908-10.
110. Id. at 907-08.
111. Id. at 918.
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the copyright holder.
In Hearn v. Meyer,"2 the plaintiff had, for over a year, painstakingly hand-copied reproductions from an out-of-print book and
wrote and organized the text around the images."' Judge Leisure
denied copyright protection on the drawn images because the ideas
from the out-of-print work were in the public domain. Verbatim
copying of text by the defendant was permitted because the text
was a factual description. 4 The defendant did not infringe on selection and presentation of facts, as the same pictures were
grouped by theme while the plaintiff grouped the pictures by artist. Moreover, because-the publisher owned the copyright, though
no royalties had been paid, the artist lacked standing to recover
damages."' A 'beneficial owner' argument for bringing this work
back into publication was rejected, relying primarily on Hoehling
and Rosemont since the "plot" of the artist's work was already in
the public domain and, therefore, not copyrightable.11
Finally, in the history of the idea-fact/expression dichotomy
concept, the law came full circle in Caratzasv. Time Life, Inc. "' In
this case, the plaintiffs theoretical ideas which were illustrated in
photographs, lost copyright protection because the evidence to
support the ideas concerned real life. In Caratzas,the court found
that "[w]hen expressing facts within the context of a particular
factual background, an author is confined to a limited number of
terms that will adequately convey the nature of the facts described."" 8 The court further stated that "[i]nfringement' of a
work's structure is proven only where direct copying is shown, as
the law recognizes that an author dealing with the same data or
facts will inevitably duplicate, to some extent, the work of other
authors."".9
B. Nature of Creative Works
To be sure, most memorable photographs are calculated by
the photographer to express a particular idea. 2 ' The photographer

112. 664 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
113. Id. at 834-37.
114. Id. at 836, 846-47.
115. Id. at 840-41.
116. Id. at 851.
117. No. CIV.92-6346, 1992 WL 322033 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1992).
118. Id. at *6.
119. Id. at *5 (relying on compilation doctrine in Feist Publications,Inc., v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 357-58 (1991)).
120. One example of an exception to this general statement would be photographs by Abraham Zapruder of the Kennedy assassination. See generally
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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does try to merge the facts to his idea when he frames the image,
and to the extent his "selection, coordination, or arrangement" 121 of
facts succeeds, society benefits in learning some truth or irony.
The facts of a fine art photograph function as a whole idea just as
words in a sentence function to convey a thought. The photographer, same as an author, seeks copyright protection on the sum total of facts, not the individual facts themselves. Although relatively few works qualify as original discoveries, some can inform
beyond the subject matter depicted, if one knows how to look. The
following excerpts from JOHN SZARKOWSKI, LOOKING AT PHOTOGRAPHS22 demonstrate this idea as an intellectual way of seeing.
Things of everyday experience had been transformed for [Edward]
Weston into organic sculptures, the forms of 1which
were both ex23
pres'sion and the justification of the life within.
He [Eugene Atget] set himself the task of understanding and interpreting in visual terms a complex, ancient and living tradition. The
pictures that he made in the service of this concept are seductively
and deceptively simple, wholly
poised, reticent, dense with experi14
ence, mysterious, and true.
Under the current legal standards, would photographs like
Atget's 'historical facts' of Paris at the turn of the century by
121. Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362
(1991).

122. SZARKOWSKI, supra note 21. Szarkowski comments about the works of
photographers in note 21 as follows:

[S]ome of the most interesting pictures were made on the periphery of the
historical events." (Robert Capa, American, born in Hungary, 1913-1954). Id.
at 146.
"They spring from a response to specific life; their formal eloquence is a
tribute to their human meaning." (Cartier-Bresson, French, 1908-). Id. at
112.
"His sensitivity to his individual subject-to expression, gesture, posture,
costume, symbol, habitat-seem unerringly precise. (August Sanders, German, 1876-1964). Id. at 102.
"The true subject of the photograph is the sinuous, vermicular, richly subtle line that described the silhouetted shape." (Irving Penn, American, 1917-).
Id. at 158.
"The character drawn in that composite portrait is of a piece, persuasive,
and less than reassuring." (Richard Avedon, American, 1923-). Id. at 168.
"It does not deal with the concept of architectural styles, but with the adventure of building grandly-and with confidence, heroism, eternity, and
time. (Edward Steichen, American, born in Luxembourg, 1879-1973). Id. at
76.
123. Id. at 84. (Edward Weston, American, 1886-1958). Photographs show

"intent that resides in natural form." Id.
124. Id. at 64. (Eugene Atget, French, 1857-1927). Atget's photographs are
known for "purity and intensity of vision." Id.
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someone unknown be protected by copyright? Would Weston's
"Pepper No. 30, 1930" or "Cabbage Leaf 1931" be copyrightable by
the Ordinary Observer standard? Aesthetically informing work
does not depend on notoriety or professional standing of the photographer. Atget, himself, was undiscovered during his lifetime.
When the validity of a copyright is challenged under Merger doctrine, will courts know how to separate quality photographic
achievement, worthy of copyright protection from other images
that fail to inform as original discoveries?
Merger doctrine, as applied to compilations of raw data as in
Feist,125 draws the line on just how low an originality standard can
go.121 Unlike Hotchkiss, the Feist decision has a very narrow application, limited to compilations of raw data. 127 Under Merger doctrine, Feist clearly denies copyright protection to 'garden variety
compilations of raw data,' works devoid of intellectual creativity,
or works of marginal improvement on the works of others.1 28 Feist
demands originality in copyrighted works, and even under Feist's
low creative standard alone, many documentary and commercial
photographs can lose copyright protection.
A review of photography cases that considered artistic expression under the Fair Use doctrine follows. These examples
show how Feist, an accurate ruling within its scope, has been applied inaccurately to intellectual property elsewhere, to lower
125. 499 U.S. at 345. Raw data is distinct from analyzed or qualitatively
sorted data. The Court defines raw data as "wholly factual information not accompanied by any original written expression." Id. "Selection implies the exercise ofjudgment in choosing which facts from a given body of data to include in a
compilation ... [alrrangement refers to the ordering or grouping of data into
lists or categories that go beyond the mere mechanical grouping of data as
such ....
Key Pub. Inc., v. Chinatown Today Pub. Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 513
(2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). "As a statutory matter, 17 U.S.C. § 101 does
not afford protection from copying to a collection of facts that are selected, coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks originality." Feist, 499 U.S. at
363-64.
126. The Feist decision is reminiscent of Hotchkiss decision which drew a
similar line between merely substituting construction materials and receiving a
patent on the product. See generally Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
248 (1850). In comparing the pre-existing product made of porcelain to the
"new" one made of clay, which sought the patent protection, the Hotchkiss Court
stated, "[t]he object of the act of Congress is to encourage men to devote their
time and talent in making new and useful discoveries in the arts, manufactures,
and compositions of matter. Id. at 260. "[Tlhe difference [between the two
products at issue] is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention." Id. at 266.
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). "The copyright in a compilation or derivative
work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not
imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material." Id.
128. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
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originality standards, and to deny copyright protection because of
the subject matter depicted.
III. RECENT CASES RELATED TO PHOTOGRAPHY
Several recent decisions are examined below for the application of copying tests under both the Merger doctrine and the Fair
Use doctrine. This Part first discusses the cases that preceded
Feist, including the Rogers district court decision. The next Section analyzes the Rogers Circuit Court of Appeals decision for application of the originality standard as set forth in Feist. Finally,
this Part reviews those cases that rely on the Rogers and Feist
opinions for application of copyright infringement tests.
A. Pre-FeistCases
1.

Alt v. Morello

9

In Alt, the defendant denied the infringement claim, rather
than setting forth a Fair Use defense.'30 The court found that the
slight alterations in the defendant's image proved infringement."'
In addition, the plaintiff was able to prove copying by showing evidence of access,3 2 although both parties had access to each other's
work. 133 The court compared the two works under an 'ordinary lay
observer' standard,'3 and held that although the defendant's work
was not an exact photographic copy, substantial copying1 31 proved

129. 227 U.S.P.Q. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
130. Alt, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 50-51. The plaintiff, a commercial photographer,

filed suit against the defendant, another commercial photographer, for willful
copying of his photograph, under 17 U.S.C. § 501. Id. at 50. The defendant did
not challenge the validity of plaintiffs copyright for Sufficient Originality or

plaintiffs standing under Work for Hire doctrine, but instead stressed the differences between the objects depicted and between the compositions. Id. at 51.
131. Id. Minor changes strongly suggested copying. Id. (citing Concord
Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315, 1316 (2d Cir. 1969);

Couleur Intl Ltd. v. Opulent Fabrics, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 152, 154 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Gross v. Seligman, 212 F.2d 930, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1914)).

132. Alt, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 51.
133. Id.
134. Id. This court follows Arnstein's Two-Step approach substituting
"ordinary lay observer" for Arnstein's "ordinary lay hearer" as it was applied in
Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan FabricsCorp. , 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977)
and Peter Pan Fabrics,Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 489, 489 (2d Cir.
1960). Alt, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 51. The court stated that "the differences between
the two photographs are so insignificant that 'the ordinary observer, unless he
set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard
their aesthetic appeal as the same.'" Id.

135. Alt, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 51.
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the defendant had appropriated the expression.
2. Curtis v. General Dynamics Corp."3 6
The plaintiff in Curtis, while a college student in Ohio, had
made a fine art print of a neighbor's wheelchair sitting on his
neighbor's back porch.' Years later, the image was published and
attracted the attention of an advertising firm. 13 A direct photostat
copy of the plaintiffs image was circulated to photographers, and
the plaintiff was asked to submit a bid for a promotional shoot featuring the wheelchair."9 A competing commercial photographer
won the job, and proceeded to copy the plaintiffs idea in most
every detail.'"
Though the defendants challenged the plaintiffs copyright
due to lack of copyright notice on early prints, the court found that
the photographs were original works of art and therefore exempt
from the statutory notice requirement.' The defendants admitted
access, but they denied copying by claiming independent creation
and different use.' The court examined evidence of Substantial
Similarity, and applied Krofft's Two-Part intrinsic test.' The inquiry was bifurcated to test for copying the nonliteral artistic organization of the work utilizing an expert witness and also tested
for literal copying.'" The Curtis court substituted "one skilled in
the art"'45 for the "ordinary reasonable person" found in Krofft.
The Fair Use defense of copying only the central part of the image
failed. 46 Photocopying the image for the purpose of soliciting bids

136. 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
137. Id. at 1610. The plaintiff was not a commercial photographer. Id. Personal acquaintance and involvement by the photographer supported his claim of
artistic rights to the copyrighted image. Id.
138. Id. at 1612.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1613.
141. Id. at 1614 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 401(a)).
142. Id. at 1612-15.
143. Id. at 1615. Copying can be shown by circumstantial evidence of access
and substantial similarity test for copying "not only of the general ideas but of
the expressions of those ideas as well." Id.
144. Id. (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Tel. Prods., Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Curtis, 562 F.2d at 1162; Durham Indus., Inc., v.
Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (paraphrasing 17 U.S.C. § 101: "[T]hus, in copyright actions, similarity of idea or function must be distinguished from similarity
of artistic expression.")).
145. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
146. Curtis, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1615 (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (stating that "no plagiarist can excuse the
wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.").
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for the ad campaign was deemed illicit copying." 7 The court further found willful copyright infringement because other views of
the wheelchair were rejected in favor of the one that matched the
plaintiffs work most closely. '
3.

Rogers v. Koons: District Court Decision

'

The defendant in Rogers challenged the copyright validity for
the non-copyrightable elements by arguing that "copyright protection extends only to original acts of expression, so that purely factual information is in the public domain.""O The defendant's
counter-claim was rejected, the court asserting manner of expression was protected "as the certificate issued by the Copyright Office reflects."' 6' The defendant denied copyright infringement because the changed medium precluded infringement. The court,
however, rejected the argument because it considered Koons'
sculpture to be a derivative of the photograph. 52
The plaintiff argued that because the defendant admitted direct copying, the court did not need to analyze substantial similarity. Citing Durham, the plaintiff argued that "where direct copying was conceded substantial similarity drops out of the
analysis."" Note, here the plaintiff substitutes Krofft's Substantial
147. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 134344 (9th Cir. 1988).

148. Curtis, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1617. The slavish copying of 57 shots of the
wheelchair compared to two or three considered works by the plaintiff, also undermined the defendant's independent creation defense. See id. at 1616 (citing
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 492 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)
(holding that good intentions not to copy are immaterial)).
149. 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Rogers, a commercial photographer
commissioned to photograph puppies, asked the owners to hold the puppies
for the purpose of the photographs. Id. at 475. The image with a copyright
notice was reproduced and distributed on notecards. Id. Koons copied the
scene in sculpture for his "Banality Show" at Sonnabend Gallery in New York.

Id.
150. Id. at 477 (citing Hoehling v. Universal Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979

(2d Cir. 1980)).
151. Id. The court added, "[ilt
is well settled that a photographer's originality

in photographic expression is entitled to full copyright protection." Id. (citing
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 55 (1884)).

152. Id. at 497.
153. Id. at 478. To support his argument, the defendant cited Illinois Bell
Tel. v. Haines & Co., Inc. 905 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990). According to
the court, "[t]o satisfy the copying element of infringement, direct evidence of
copying will suffice .... Establishing substantial similarity is necessary
when direct evidence of copying is unavailable." Id. The court also cited the
Feist district court decision, Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. v. Feist Publications. 663 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. Kan. 1987). In Rural Telephone Services,
Judge Rogers reasoned that since the defendants admitted using Rural's work
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Similarity test for the second part of the the test for copying original material under Arnstein. Under Arnstein, if direct coopying is
found, it is not necessary to test for indirect copying. However,
under Arnstein copying is not necesarily illicit copying and only
copying of truly original parts or aspects of the work may be considered under Step Two. The Rogers court did not then recognize
the Sufficient Originality test as such in Durham, but did find
Durham analogous as follows: "two-dimensional cartoons [copied
from three-dimensional characters] are the functional equivalents
of a three-dimensional sculpture copied from a two-dimensional
photograph."" The court held, therefore, that the sculpture constituted a derivative work based upon the photograph, and as
such, violated the exclusive rights of the plaintiff as artist.
Finally, in considering whether the defendant "intended to comment
satirically upon contemporary values" under the Fair Use doctrine,
the court rejected the argument because the defendant's work did
not "criticize" or "comment" on the plaintiffs photograph. 15
B. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co."5 7
On March 27, 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Tenth Circuit's opinion, Rural Telephone Service Co. v. Feist Publications,Inc. 5 8 The Supreme Court reversed Rural subsequent to
the Rogers District Court decision,"9 but prior to the Second Circuit Rogers appeal."" Rural was reversed on the basis that "raw
data" alone may not be copyrighted.'
Had the lower court properly considered Feist's Sufficient Originality counter-claim against
evidence of direct copying of fictitious listings, the Circuit Court
would likely have reached the same result.

to prepare their own, it was "unnecessary to consider the defendant's contentions that copying did not occur. The 'substantial similarity' test is used when
there is no direct evidence of copying."). Id. (paraphrasing Durham Indus. v.
Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911-12 (2d Cir. 1980)).
154. Rogers, 751 F. Supp. at 478. It is "fundamental that copyright in a work
protects against unauthorized copying not only in the original medium in which
the work was produced, but also in any one medium as well." Id. (citation omitted).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 479.
157. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).

158. Id.
159. Rogers was decided on December 13, 1990, prior to the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Feist Publications. Rogers was before the court on a
motion for summary judgment.

160. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (decided on April 2,
1992).
161. Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-64.
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C. Post-Feist Publications Cases
1.

Rogers v. Koons: Second CircuitDecision 62

A year later, Rogers was affirmed on appeal,' using the low
creativity standard in the Feist compilation doctrine to validate
Rogers' copyright. This opinion has generated much controversy
among authors.'1 This author found three errors in the opinion,
two of which concern the Merger doctrine, and the third relates to
Fair Use.
First, concerning the copyright validity challenge, the court
cited Durham, but failed to follow its teaching. In both Durham
and Arnstein, copying is not necessarily illicit copying. Had the
court applied an extrinsic test based on an informed judgment,

comparing the works with respect to use and function, the 'heart'
of Koons' sculpture would have appeared very different from
Rogers' photograph, though superficially the same.
The second error is reading Feist as having established a low
standard of originality for all intellectual property. Though the
Rogers court cites Feist for support, it clearly contradicts the Supreme Court's view about the importance of originality in copyrighted works. 6 5 In analyzing copyright infringement disputes,

162. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
163. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
164. See, e.g., Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the Killing Jar, 79 IOWA L.
REV. 367 (1994) (criticizing Rogers); Willajeanne F. McLean, All's not Fair in
Art and War: A Look at the Fair Use Defense after Rogers v. Koons, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 373 (1993) (criticizing Rogers); Steven Shonack, Postmodern Piracy:
How Copyright Law Constrains ContemporaryArt, 14 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 281
(1994) (criticizing Rogers); E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A
Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473 (1993)
(detailing the Rogers decision); Robert A. French, Note, Copyright: Rogers v.
Koons: Artistic Appropriationand the Fair Use Defense, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 175
(1993) (criticizing Rogers); Marlin H. Smith, Note, The Limits of Copyright:
Property, Parody, and the Public Domain, 42 DUKE L.J. 1233 (1993)
(criticizing Rogers); Jessica L. Darraby, The 'Koons' Case Exposes the Dog-EatDog Art World, L.A. DAILY J., Aug 5, 1992, at 7; Deborah Squiers, Illegal
Copying of Photograph Found: Artist's Change in Medium to Sculpture no
Bar to Infringement Suit, N.Y.L.J., Dec 14, 1990, at 1.
165. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. Citing The Trademark Cases, the Court stated
that:
The [Trademark Cases] Court emphasized the creative component of
originality. It described copyright as being limited to 'original intellectual conceptions of the author' . . . and stressed the importance of re-

quiring an author who accuses another of infringement to prove 'the
existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of
thought, and conception.'
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Judge Caramone's catch phrase "only a dash of it will do"" has
been relied upon by other courts, as if an accurate paraphrase of
Feist.6' It is not. According to Feist, only a "dash" of originality,
even for compilations of raw data, will not do. The Supreme Court
reversed the Tenth Circuit in Feist because the copyrighted work
was not sufficiently original. The Rogers court defined originality
as if it meant "origination." 8'
The third error concerns damages. Under Fair Use doctrine,
the court balanced the defendant's profits from sales of his work,
construed as 'the nature of the use,' Factor One, 69 against plaintiffs anticipated losses, Factor Four.7 0 In weighing profits against
losses in order to calculate a "reasonable royalty," 7' under patent
law, the plaintiff must show actual damages or, alternatively, a
pre-infringement projection of the profits that would result from
the infringement. 7 ' The Rogers court, however, required no such
showing and held that the defendant's commercial exploitation of
the image and personal enrichment weighed against the defendant's Merger doctrine challenge on copyright validity. 72 The
court, citing Sony Corp. of America, reasoned that "where a use has
no demonstrable impact on a copyright owners' potential market,
the use need not be prohibited to protect the artist's incentive to
pursue his inventive skills. Yet where the use is intended for com166. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307.
167. See generally Epic Metals Corp. v. Condec, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009,
1013 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Davidov v. Tapemeasure Enter. Inc. 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
1382, 1384-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See also Santrayll v. Burrell, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Tienshan, Inc. v. C.C.A. Intl, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 651
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Modern Publishing Co. v. Landoll, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 129
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).

168. See supra note 1 for the definitions of originality and origination.
169. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994).

"[T]he factors to be considered shall in-

clude.., the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes .... " Id.
170. Id. § 107. "[Tlhe factors to be considered shall include ... the effect of
Id.
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work ....
Under Factor Four, the Rogers court decided a balance "must be struck between
the benefit gained by the copyright owner when the copying is found an unfair
use and the benefit gained by the public when the use is held to be fair." Rogers,
960 F.2d at 311.
171. For a discussion of "reasonable royalty," see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
172. ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 801 nn.1, 2 (1992) (citing
Skenyon & Porcelli, Patent Damages, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
762, 765 (1988)).
173. A similar commercial exploitation challenge to Fair Use defense under
Merger doctrine was used in Mathieson v. Associated Press, 23 U.S.P.Q.2D
1685 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), but with different results. See infra notes 175-84 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Mathieson decision.
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mercial gain some meaningful likelihood of future harm is presumed."74
In the field of intellectual property law and in the context of
alleged infringements, commercial success has little to do with
proving illicit copying and is therefore outside the constitutional
mandate. Such challenges to a Fair Use defense are usually made
only when there is evidence of "bad faith" dealings, such as fraud,
deception, or passing off. As for the purely speculative infringement losses claimed by Rogers, the burden of proof was on Koons
to show the two works would not compete for the same buyers.
The price difference alone proved that.
17
2. Mathieson v. Associated Press

The plaintiff in Mathieson, a commercial photographer and
personal acquaintance of Oliver North, photographed North in a
bullet-proof vest. 7 ' The photograph was to appear in a brochure
for North's company. 177 An Associated Press (AP) photographer
photographed North holding the brochure which displayed the
plaintiffs copyrighted photographs. Thereafter, AP separated
plaintiffs photograph from the brochure and disseminated78 the
work through the news wire in connection with a news story.'
The defendant asserted the Fair Use defense, arguing that,
under Merger doctrine, news reporting is a permissible use of a
copyrighted photograph in the context of distributing the images
with a news story. 179 The plaintiff alleged "bad faith" use of the
images in a stock photo file and argued the defendant should
therefore be precluded from making a Fair Use defense."' The defendant, however, stopped commercial use of the photographs
upon notification to desist, and the court reasoned that purely
speculative allegations, in the absence of probative evidence of
likelihood or intent of infringement, did not support a "bad faith"
174. Id. at 312 (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)). Sony was a contributory infringement case. No such
presumption of harm is available where the infringer created profits by making
valuable improvements on the copyrighted work. See Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp., 29 F. Supp. 729, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (holding actual damages should
be weighed against profits, as apportioned with respect to relative contribution).
175. 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1685 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
176. Id. at 1685-86.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1686.
180. Id. The plaintiff also argued that the defendant should be barred from
using the Fair Use defense on the grounds of the defendant filing a copy of the
photographs to make it available for reuse, and on the grounds of the commercial purpose outweighing the news reporting purpose. Id. at 1687-88.
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claim.""

Under Factor Two of Fair Use doctrine, Nature of Copyrighted Work, the court reasoned that the plaintiff no longer controlled "first public appearance of the photos"' a and the factual or
informational nature of the work favored the defendant. 8' The
court stated that,
[iun making the determination as to a work's non-factual or creative
component, the threshold is not so low as the 'originality' standard
for copyrightability (i.e. the "minimal creative spark" requirement
from Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co. []);
rather, for the second factor in the fair use analysis to weigh in favor of the
l creator, the work must be 'creative, imaginative, and
original', 84

3.

185
Caratzas v. Time Life, Inc.

In Caratzas, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction
against the defendant for alleged infringement, although the
plaintiff could not prove ownership of the infringed photographs
and thus could not show irreparable harm.' The content of the

photographs was substantially similar, but the court determined
that the images were non-copyrightable as a matter of law because
they depicted historical facts.8 7 The same held true on the issue of
theme appropriation.'88 The structure and presentation of the
Caratzas book was protected, although in a limited way. 88
181. Id. at 1687-88.
182. Id. at 1689.

183. Id.
184. Id. (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981). Finding "sufficiently non-factual" work was gauged against "fine art photographs
of surrealistic character. Id. (comparing Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1986) with Guccione v. Flynt, 617 F. Supp. 917
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
185. No. CIV.92-6346, 1992 WL 322033 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1992).
186. Id. at *1-3. The plaintiff publisher did not own 11 of the copyrighted

and infringed photographs and therefore lacked standing. Id. at *3. The defendant denied copying the other 33 images by showing evidence of independent creation. Id. at *3-*4.
187. Id. at *2-*4. The plaintiffs argued that by using the term 'appropriating,'
they meant to suggest "that the concepts and ideas developed throughout [the
work of the defendant] were contained in [the plaintiffs'] text and illustrations."
Id. at *4.
188. Id. at *4-*5.
189. Id. at *5 (citing Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Ser'v. Co., Inc., 499 U.S.

340, 358 (1991). The defendants had conceded access yet were not required to
show independent creation. Though the court found many of the same selections of subjects, the subjects appeared in different parts of the books. Id. at'
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The defendant admitted copying, but invoked the Fair Use
doctrine." The court held that all four factors favored the defendant, stating that the use was "scholarly in that it provides a historical treatment that is more accessible to the general public;"
the plaintiffs works were previously published; the quantity of the
plaintiffs' works, illicitly copied, constituted a very small portion of
the works; and the "public will benefit from the broad dissemination of historical information [contained in] this material."19 ' The
court reached no final decision on whether the Fair Use defense
would succeed at trial, but denied issuance of a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs could not show substantial similarity. 1
In balancing the plaintiffs substantial similarity claims, the
court relied heavily on Hoehling and Merger doctrine to invalidate
copyright protection for most of the plaintiffs work.' 3 Hoehling,
however, only invalidates copyright for historical facts and themes
already in the public domain, and where each author has equal access to the public works.' Since most of the plaintiffs' copyright
was invalidated at the outset, the defendants in Caratzas were not
required to show independent creation concerning the structure
and creation of the book. The court saw the work as mostly historical fact and attributed almost none of its value to Professor
Jashemski's expression, exposition, or intellectual achievement.

*6. The court determined that the subjects were typical, "general ones" normally found in comprehensive works on Pompeii. Id.
190. Id. at *7.
191. Id. at *7-*8.
192. Id. at *8.
193. Hoehling warns that "in distinguishing between themes, facts, and scenes
a faire on the one hand, and copyrightable expression on the other, courts may
lose sight of the forest for the trees. By factoring out similarities based on noncopyrightable elements, a court runs the risk of overlooking wholesale usurpation of a prior author's expression." Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
618 F.2d 972, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1980). Hoehlingfurther stated that, "courts should
assure themselves that the works before them are not virtually identical." Id. at
980. Finally, the court stated:
In works devoted to historical subjects ... a second author may make
significant use of prior work, so long as he does not bodily appropriate
the expression of another

... Knowledge is expanded as well by

granting new authors of historical works a relatively free hand to build
upon the work of their predecessors.
Id. at 980 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 974. The,Hoehling court noted that "the scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow indeed, embracing no more than the author's original expression of particular facts and theories already in the public domain."
Id. (emphasis added).
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9

In Davidov, the plaintiffs claimed infringement based upon
the defendants' use of the plaintiffs' photographs for a new fabric
design. 9 ' The defendant challenged the copyright validity on the
ground that the fabric design was copyrighted before the photographs were copyrighted.'97 However, because the photographs
were part of a larger commissioned and copyrighted work owned
by the plaintiff, the photographs were protected.
The court held that the actual pieces of jewelry depicted in
the photographs were "noncopyrightable elements" and could be
freely used by others for design.'98 If the plaintiffs original studio
set-up had not been copied, the court reasoned, the defendant
would only have "mimicked plaintiffs arrangement and depiction
of the jewelry . . . . ""', If the photographer's set up had not been
copied the claim would have been dismissed. Four infringing images were found using the "ordinary observer" test for Substantial
Similarity.2°° Extrinsic differences due to different medium and
use were not considered under the Fair Use doctrine. The defendants had denied copying by claiming that "dimensions, color, and
image clarity" differed enough that a reasonable juror would not
find the two items substantially similar.201 Additionally, the defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to show independent
creation.0 2 Summary judgment was denied, in part, but granted

195. 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
196. Id. at 1383.
197. Id. at 1384 n.3. The defendants denied copying but admitted access to
the photographs. Id. at 1384.
198. Id. at 1385.
199. Id. The court cited Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992),

and reasoned that "[ellements of originality in a photograph may include
posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the
desired expression, and almost any other variant involved." Davidov, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1385.
200. Id. at 1385-86 (relying on Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307 (quoting Ideal Toy
Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966)). The court also refers
to Peter Pan, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). Id.

The Davidov court hereby reaffirmed the error in Rogers where the intrinsic test
for copying in Ideal Toy was lumped with the extrinsic test for copyright validity
in Peter Pan Fabrics, both under Fair Use doctrine in the test for Substantial
Similarity. See supra note 58 for a discussion of the Ordinary Observer test.
201. Davidov, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1386 n.4. To the degree commissioned work
is dictated by clients, laws, rules, or other constraints inhibiting free choice
and creative expression, originality is lacking. "Practically inevitable" selec-

tion and arrangement of subject matter does not possess the "minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution." Feist, 449
U.S. at 363.
202. Davidov, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1386. "[Elvidence of independent creation
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for those works where "the lack of substantial similarity is so clear
as to fall outside the range of reasonably disputed fact questions
requiring resolution by a jury." "' The plaintiff claimed injury
without specifying the amount, but ° statutory damages may be
claimed if actual losses are unknown."
5.

Epic Metals Corp. v. Condec, Inc."'

The defendants in Epic challenged the copyright of the photographs under Merger doctrine2" because they "simply depict various stages of construction which could easily be obtained from any
number of job sites." 207 The plaintiff, a competing manufacturer,
sought to "protect the actual reproduction of the expression of the
idea, the photographs themselves.""8 The court found that photographs, in general, were protected by copyright law, citing Rogers
for support. 2°9 As for this variety of photography "[tihe quantity of
originality that need be shown is modest-only a dash of it will
do."2 10 Relying on Blackman v.Hustler Magazine, Inc.,2" the court
held that the plaintiffs property right to control reproduction
Ironically,
trumped the defendant's Merger doctrine defense. 2
the Epic court did require a showing of sufficient creative content
in the charts and tables of numerical data.

" Id.
may rebut a plaintiffs prima facie case of copyright infringement ....
(citing Eden Toys, Inc., v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir.
1982)).
203. Id. at 1385 (quoting Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720
F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1983). Judge Freeh found the "arrangement and depiction" of the jewelry "strikingly similar." Id.
204. Id. at 1382 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 504 (plaintiff may "elect statutory, rather
than actual damages when actual damages are difficult to ascertain.")); Lau-

ratex Textile Corp. v.Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 900, 903-04
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding statutory damages appropriate "as a deterrent to

further activity of this kind.")).
205. 867 F. Supp. 1009 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
206. The Merger doctrine under Fair Use doctrine as defined in Bellsouth
Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v Donnelley Info. Publ'g, 999 F.2d 1436, 1442 (11th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1101 (1994) (holding "where there is only one or

so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the idea itself.").
207. Id. at 1013-14 (citing Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info.
Publ'g, 999 F.2d 1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1101 (1994)).
208. Id. at 1014.
209. Id. at 1013. (citing Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992)).
210. Id.
211. 620 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1985).
212. Epic Metals, 867 F. Supp. at 1013-14.
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D. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY

The case results are here compared and contrasted in light of
the four main issues to decide in a copyright infringement lawsuit:
copyright validity, reproduction or direct copying, substantial
similarity, and fair use. Some of the inconsistency between courts
can be explained by the different kinds of photography, the different purposes served, and the varied circumstances of ownership of
the photographs. The chart in Table 1 locates the cases on a continuum of most-to-least copyright protection, sorted by these factors of kind, purpose and authorship. Grouped along these lines,
the cases, identified by plaintiff, can be sorted as follows:
Kind of Photography-Alt, Davidov, and Rogers are studio setups; Mathieson, Caratzas and Epic Metals were on-site photography. Alt and Curtis photographs were art work for their portfolios.
Purpose- The photographs at issue in Rogers and Caratzas
were commissioned for documentary work; Davidov, Epic Metals,
and Mathieson photographs were commissioned for advertising;.
Copyright Ownership- Works belonging to Caratzas, Mathieson, Davidov and Epic Metals were part of larger, copyrighted
works. With the exception of Mathieson, the photographs were not
taken by and printed by the plaintiff. Alt, Curtis and Rogers were
singular photographs and plaintiffs were the photographers.
1. Copyright Validity
Proof of copyright ownership was challenged in Curtis,"'
21 " Davidov,
2 16
Mathieson,"4 Caratzas,
and Epic Metals. 7 The plaintiffs' standing was validated in all cases, except for certain photo1 s In Curtis, the
graphs made by a deceased artist in Caratzas.
original photographic work lacked copyright notice but, as art
work, it was exempt from the statutory notice requirement.1 9 In
Davidov and Epic Metals, however, copyright on the larger works
sufficed to cover the photographs. In Caratzas, the book's copyright did not extend to the photographs which were either owned
or commissioned by others.22

The defendant had reproduced the

copyrighted image without its copyright notice in Mathieson, but
213. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.

214. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
215. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.

216. See discussion supra Part III.C.4.
217. See discussion supra Part III.C.5.
218. Caratzas v. Time Life, Inc., No. CLV.92-6346, 1992 WL 322033, at *2-*3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1992).
219. Curtis v. General Dynamics Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1614-15 (W.D.
Wash. 1990).
220. Caratzas, 1992 WL 322033 at *2-3.
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in the context of news reporting.
Challenges based upon non-copyrightable subject matter were
made in all of the cases.222 In Epic Metals, Rogers and Alt, generic
images were challenged for lack of originality, whereas in Caratzas,. Mathieson, Curtis, and Davidov, the factual objects depicted
were challenged for copyrightability. Originality was deemed sufficient in Epic Metals and Rogers, both courts citing Feist.223 Factual elements of a composition, such as pens in Alt, and a wheelchair in combination with other elements in Curtis, did not lose
copyright protection, but historical facts such as the ancient gardens in Caratzas, news reports in Mathieson, and previously
copyrighted facts in Davidov's jewelry designs were separated out
from the rest of the image and thereby rendered not copyrightable.
2. Reproduction or Direct Copying
Direct copying was admitted in Epic Metals, Mathieson,
Rogers, and in Caratzaswith respect to certain unprotected photographs. Access to plaintiffs' work was found in all cases. In Alt
and Davidov, access was denied but no proof of independent creation was provided. The defendants prevailed, in part by showing
independent creation in Curtis and in Caratzas.
3.

SubstantialSimilarity

Under the doctrine of Substantial Similarity, the court first
analyzes the works at issue for similarities. 2 If substantial similarities are found, the court then decides, as a matter of law,
whether the ordinary observer, rather than one-skilled-in-the-art,
would recognize one work as copied from another. Technical differences, like cropping out all but the wheelchair in Curtis or
changed medium in Rogers and Davidov, was looked upon as evidence of trying to hide copying. Plaintiff in Epic Metals and Caratzas did not claim infringement beyond the facts pictured, relying
instead on property rights to the object photograph to control
copying. Mathieson and Rogers claimed both copyright ownership
221. Mathieson, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1685-86.
222. See generally discussion supra Parts III.A, III.B, III.C.
223. See generally Epic Metals Corp. v. Condec, 867 F. Supp. 1009 (M.D. Fla.
1994); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). Both cases discussed the
sufficiency of originality while referring to the standard under factual compilation doctrine in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991)).
224. See, e.g., Curtis, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1617. According to the court, "[a] copyright infringement may occur by reason of a substantial similarity that involves
only a small portion of each work." Id. at 1616 (quoting Burroughs v. MetroGoldwyn Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 624 n.14 (2d Cir. 1982).
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and artistic rights. On the artistic rights claim, Mathieson
failed,222 and Rogers succeeded."2 Courts found Substantial Similarity between the plaintiffs' and defendants' works in Alt, Rogers;
Davidov and Curtis on the basis of defendants copying the same
facts in the same manner, presumably to express the same227idea.
Courts considered similar lighting strong evidence of copying.

4. FairUse
Given a finding of substantial copying, a Fair Use defense,
under § 107, can be used depending on the following factors: 1)
purpose and character of the use; 2) nature of the copyrighted
work; 3) amount copied; and 4) market effect of the infringed
work. 228 Fair Use defense was raised under Factor One in Mathi-

eson, Caratzas,and Rogers; under Factor Two in Rogers, Caratzas
for the photographs, and Epic Metals for the photographs and tables; under Factor Three in Caratzas,Epic Metals, both with respect to the text, and Mathieson; and under Factor Four in Caratzas and Rogers.
The courts were not persuaded by the Fair Use defense in
Epic Metals or Rogers and entered summary judgment against the
defendants. The Caratzas court accepted defendant's Fair Use defense on all four factors, and denied plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction. Fair Use defense was not offered in Curtis,Alt, or
Davidov, as defendants denied copyright infringement. In Mathieson, with the news reporting analyzed under Factor One, the noncopyrightable elements copied analyzed under Factor Three, and
the market effect analyzed under Factor Four, Fair Use doctrine
favored the defendant, while degree of creativity, despite an advertising purpose, weighed for plaintiff. In these courts, pointing
out the differences between the plaintiffs' and defendants' works
was not a defense under Fair Use doctrine.
IV. CRITICAL SYNTHESIS

The Rogers court set in motion a body of law that can greatly
diminish copyright protection for creative photography, and crea225. The court cited M.C.A., Inc. v. Wilson for the standard in creativity,
and cited Feist for the originality requirement. See Mathieson, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1689.
226. The court cited the Feist compilation doctrine, "a dash will do." Rogers,
960 F.2d at 307.
227. See generally Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d. 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992)
(suggesting.that a particular light is part of one's expression of ideas making it
"original and copyrightable").
228. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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tive expression generally. The Rogers decision and other postFeist cases reviewed above set undesirable precedents in two ways:
first, the decisions seem to render all facts and ideas not copyrightable, whether original to the author or pre-existing in the public
domain; and second, the decisions fail to apply Merger doctrine
against pre-existing public domain ideas to invalidate those works
lacking in original ideas, while deferring to property rights to control direct copying. By asserting that ideas are equivalent to the
facts expressed in a given work and no more, that all kinds of facts
are the same, and that no facts are copyrightable, then no ideas
are copyrightable. A substantive analysis to distinguish between
different kinds of ideas and different kinds of facts, namely a test
for originality and use of the works at issue, is missing from this
logic.
The superficial way of discerning illicit copying from copying
found in Rogers, based on the Ordinary Observer test, is rooted in
Krofft. 2 9 But, as previously noted, the Krofft intrinsic test for Substantial Similarity is a substitute for the extrinsic test in Arnstein,
which judged originality, copyright validity and copying per se as a
matter of law. Arnstein also provides for jury consensus, where
reasonable minds may differ on what is original, and experts may
be necessary to discern copying where public domain ideas are not
commonly known. Mathieson applied an extrinsic test for creativity, but not for originality. 230
Under the rationale used in Arnstein, Step One-part one, an
extrinsic test, permits the court to decide direct copying as a matter of law on the basis of either property rights or by taking the
'heart' of another's work, which again may require an expert to
discern the "heart." If copying is indirect, then substantive analysis, Step One-part two, comparable to the Substantial Similarity
test found in Krofft, is necessary to discern copying the author's
original idea, the 'heart' of the work. This subjective part of Step
229. Sid & Marty Krofft Tel. Prods., Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977). In Rogers, the court described the Ordinary Observer test to
discern Substantial Similarity. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307-08 (2d Cir.
1992). The court relied on varying precedent, including Peter Pan Fabrics,
though omitting an important caveat in PeterPan Fabricswhich tests for use or
function of the infringing work as follows: the Ordinary Observer test is enough
to determineillicit copying, "unless protection against infringement is to be denied because of variants irrelevant to the purpose for which the design is intended." Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
230. See Judith B. Prowda, Application of Copyright and Trademark Law in
the Protection of Style in the Visual Arts, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 269-79
(1995), for a discussion of expert testimony and protecting style in the visual
arts.
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One determines whether the indirect copying of one from the other
would be recognized, generally, by the "ordinary observer."
Krofft merges Arnstein's copying and illicit copying tests, using Arnstein's extrinsic superficial test but dropping what it was
designed to measure, namely originality and function. Krofft uses
the copying test to dissect superficial features of both works in
question for similarities, whereas in Arnstein, the Ordinary Lay
Hearer in the copying test is used to detect differences.
As previously noted, inquiry into copying the 'heart,'23' or extrinsic use and function,2 ' and indirect copying, has been subsumed in Krofft under Fair Use doctrine. If the defendant denies
copying but striking similarities are found, the court can enter
summary judgment... and the defendants arguments under Factor
Two and Factor Three can never be made. Even if copying is admitted, but copyright infringement is denied under Fair Use, and
the Factor Two and Factor Three analyses are used at trial, Factor
One and Factor Four"4 may trump, as the court must weigh all
four factors together."' 'Better and cheaper' way and 'personal
enrichment,' results of copying, are extrinsic to discerning illicit
copying in the Arnstein tradition, however, and therefore lie outside the constitutional mandate.
Factor One and Factor Four were merged in Caratzas to
permit copying for a 'better and cheaper' way, but were used to
penalize copying for 'personal enrichment' where the infringing
work lacked educational value, as in Rogers.136 'Educational value,'
231. The 'heart' relates to Factor Three of the Fair Use Doctrine: "[Tihe

amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole. " 17 U.S.C. § 107. Factor Three must be evaluated on both a
quantitative and a qualitative basis. New Era Pub. Int'l v. Carol Pub. Group,
904 F.2d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1990). Factor Three provides plaintiffs a remedy
where the significant portion used was "essentially the heart" of the copyrighted
work. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 738 (2d Cir. 1991).
232. Extrinsic use and function relates to Factor Two of the Fair Use doctrine:
"the nature of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. §107. Two aspects of Factor
Two apply, namely excluding noncopyrightable information from protection and
excluding banal works from protection under the Merger doctrine. The first aspect applies traditionally to historical and biographical facts in non-fiction, news
reports, and compilations. The second aspect, the Merger doctrine, applies to

both fiction and non-fiction to eliminate copyright protection for broad concepts
pre-existing in the public domain. This Article has focused on Factor Two and
clarifying the distinction between these two aspects of the Fair Use doctrine.
233. See generally Alan J. Hartnick, Summary Judgment in Copyright:
From Cole Porterto Superman, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53 (1984).
234. See generally Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992)
(discussing Factor One and Factor Four analysis).
235. Id. at 309.

236. See also Caratzas v. Time Life, Inc. No. CIV.92-6346, 1992 WL 322033,

1996]

Photographer'sRights

a normative judgment, can be censorship under the guise of public
policy. Thus, the Hotchkiss Court wisely separated out products of
entrepreneuring per se from gaining protection as a policy matter
under copyright law." 7 Compare, for example, the results on this
point in Caratzas, Rogers, Mathieson: Plaintiffs lost in Caratzas
and Mathieson, where, in both cases, the work was directly commercially reproduced. Mathieson's images of Oliver North had
more commercial value than the photographs in Caratzas, yet
Mathieson had to show actionable copying beyond use for news reporting. In Rogers, plaintiff won, although the work that was
copied was itself a commercial reproduction, of limited value by a
non-famous photographer, while the 'reproduction' was an original
work, site specific, made for an entirely different market, and valued for the artist's name.
A. Artistic Expression
The courts, in the cases under discussion, worked from a concrete definition of 'idea,' presuming a one-to-one ideafact/expression dichotomy after Krofft, whereas traditionally, 'idea'
in copyright law has been defined in the abstract."8 Ideas-facts
and expression are rarely one-to-one reflections of each other in
straight art photography, though that is precisely the goal and
what tends to motivate originality. Ideas-facts, generally concrete
and routine in commercial work, can be reflected one-to-one in
their expression because of rigid constraints. Defining idea as
equivalent to manner of expression captures most of what can be
original in commercial work, since usually the abstract ideas come
from the public domain and most concrete ideas are determined by
others who commission the work.
In art, idea is everything. Distinctive manner, in the craft
and in the execution of the idea, is expected to be there as well, but
it is measured by degree of fineness or aesthetics. If the work is
routine or banal, the manner of expression is all there is to copy.
In such cases, the idea-equivalent-to-expression framework of
analysis is probably a reasonable way to proceed to show copying,
but not necessarily infringement. The copied image must first be
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1992) (noting that the infringer is favored if the use is
for scholarship or research).
237. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hotchkiss
standard.
238. Copyright law distinguishes between abstract concepts, which are not
copyrightable, and original ideas, which are copyrightable. See generally
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 13.03, 1.10, 16.01 (1974)

(commenting on protecting unfixed ideas under contract and fiduciary trust
law).
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copyrightable.
Important productive creative works, works that deserve further consideration or start a movement, will have original ideas, in
addition to commonly known ideas, born out of common knowledge
and invention. As evidenced by the existence of memorable, exponential works that spawn the works of others, idea, as the flip-side
of expression, is not necessarily at unity with expression in creative works. Originality, beyond technique, in "Writings and Discoveries" then, can only be measured by its impact on mind and
spirit of the Ordinary Observer, or by its distinctiveness in its
field, as measured by the expert witness. If courts define ideas or
facts as equivalent to manner of expression under Fair Use doctrine, then 'heart,' Factor Three, and 'soul,' Factor Two, found in
some important works are left unprotected.
Traditionally, a suspected infringing work is permitted to
draw from pre-existing material in the public domain. Two
authors may, with or without access to each other's work, use some
of the same commonly known or accessible facts, theories, or
themes in their respective works."s Traditionally, Merger doctrine
has been used to prevent validating works that merely mimic
common knowledge and ways of expression, works which are so
devoid of a point of view that it merges with the prototype or abstract concept itself. Those repetitive works contribute nothing to
the societal pool of knowledge.
Today, however, the absence of a nonobviousness standard in
copyright law and in the absence of a Sufficient Originality test,
permits prototypical images to be copyrighted and, in effect, monopolize abstract ideas. The courts compare the works before
them for similarities in manner of expression, and without reference to their significance as compared to similar works in a wider
field of use. The courts examined in this article did not measure
the work, both plaintiffs and the defendant's, against abstract
concepts in their respective works, to qualify each work's Discovery and thereby, right to copyright.

239. See Hoebling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir.
1980). According to the court,
[a] verbatim reproduction of another's work, of course, even in the
realm of nonfiction, is actionable as copyright infringement ....In
works devoted to historical subjects ...a second author may make
significant use of prior work, so long as he does not bodily appropriate
the expression of another.
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B. CommercialExpression

The purely commercial, commissioned photographs in Rogers,
Davidov, and Epic Metals, record the unedited facts before them in
a repetitive way. Generally, the commissioning party should own
the copyright to these works, " unless, by contract, rights are retained by the photographer. Mathieson knew his client Oliver
North, a factor that separates his work from the others. His personal involvement improved his artist's rights to the work.
Commercial work can appropriately be measured against
Feist for copyrightabilty when it is nonfiction, broadly defined, at
the level of compilations and directories. Nothing but the technical aspects of commercial works can set them apart from thousands of others made from the same prototype. Courts assume
that studio lighting and set-up are part of expression. It can be, as
in the Sarony photograph, but normally it is not. In fact, a commercial photographer's reputation depends on delivering consistent and predictable results. Lighting and set-up generally follow
standard published formulas. Sarony's portrait of Oscar Wilde is
copyrightable, by the constitutional standard, only because he
broke those rules in a dramatic new way that worked.
C. OriginalityStandard
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, common law copyright protected unpublished works of authorship.241 Rooted in privacy
rights under the First Amendment and its general prohibition
against usurpation of another's own expression, federal protection
under the Copyright Act of 1909 was an option to common law protection under state law. 2 The Copyright Act of 1976 did not seek

240. See Schatt v. Curtis Management Group, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 902, 906
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Lumier v. Robertson-Cole Distrib. Corp., 280 F. 550,
553 (2d Cir. 1922)). "Where a party commissions specific work by a photographer, the right to the copyright in the underlying photographs resides with the
commissioning party." Id.

241. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) affords protection under federal copyright law for
those works "created on or after January 1, 1978" and that right "subsists
from its creation." Id. "Created" means "fixed in a copy or phonorecord for
the first time. " Id. § 101. See RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA,
CASES ON COPYRIGHT, 24-34 (6th. ed. 1995); see also Schatt, 764 F. Supp. at
902 (discussing investive and divestive publication of James Dean photographs); See NIMMER, supra note 238 at §§ 13.03, 1.10, 16.01 for a discussion
on protecting 'unfixed' ideas under contract and fiduciary trust law.
242. Today, common law copyright still protects some works already in the
public domain prior to January 1, 1978, while existing unpublished works created prior to January 1, 1978, were brought under federal law. See BROWN &
DENICOLA, supra note 241, at 29.
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to change the Copyright Act of 1909.23 Therefore, the body of law
cited to trace the history of the idea-factlexpression dichotomy
with respect to originality should be valid. The "originality requirement articulated in The Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles
Lithographic remains "the touchstone of copyright protection to2
day." 4
In Burrow-Giles Lithographic, the Court held that preexisting facts must be separated from original new ideas. Furthermore, non-copyrightable material cannot be infringed upon,
and authors claiming illicit copying or copyright infringement
must prove "the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, "of thought, and conception."246 Judge Meskil, in
Durham," noted with reference to the Ordinary Observer test for
originality in copyrighted works, "copyright protection extends
only to the artistic aspects, but not the mechanical or utilitarian
features, of a protected work."247 Direct copying is not necessarily
illicit copying under Merger doctrine and Fair Use doctrine.
Hoehling teaches that fiction may draw freely from nonfiction.
Devoid of artistic distinction, the photographic image at issue in
Rogers was, by analogy, nonfiction and Koons' sculpture was fiction. Though the sculpture lacked artistic quality in its form, its
creativity, as evidenced by its function in the Banality Exhibit,
made it fiction. If Koons only meant to comment satirically on
contemporary values depicted in Rogers' photograph, then why did
he want the sculpture to look exactly like Rogers' photograph
when he could have used a composite? The Koons' sculpture was
not created to stand alone. It was used as a symbol, one element
of many. He created the work as curator, not artist. Viewed as
part of a larger work, Koons' expression shows us that Rogers'
photograph was no more infringed upon than the noncopyrightable Bakelite jewelry designs pictured on Tapemeasure's cloth in
Davidov.
D. A Three-Step Test
The Two-Part intrinsic test for Substantial Similarity, applied
in Rogers and in other cases reviewed here, is inadequate to filter
243. In a report to Congress, the Register of Copyrights "suggested making the
originality requirement [of the 1909 Act] explicit." Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991)).

244. Id. at 347
245. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884).

246. See Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909-18 (2d Cir. 1980)
for a discussion of originality, relying in large part on Batlin & Son, Inc., v.
Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976 ).
247. Id. at 913 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954)).
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out expression borrowed from the public domain, particularly in
commercial and documentary works. The unique features of
straight creative photography, in particular, pose problems as to
the correct standard of originality for protection of those works.
The Three-Step test 8 for illicit copying otherwise being applied to
functional works in copyright law holds promise as a possible solution. Typically the Three-Step test has been used in disputes
over computer programs, accounting systems, management programs and the like. This test recognizes that non-literal as well as
literal elements in a work may be protected under copyright law.
Like Arnstein's Two-Step test, this test eliminates noncopyrightable elements before any comparison for illicit copying is made.
In Step One, Abstraction, elements of the process are identified, starting with directional cues or instructions, rising to modules of processing, and ending with abstract concepts or function.
Step Two, Filtration, deals with eliminating those elements incidental or necessary to the function and validating protectible those
elements "not necessary to that purpose or function." 9 For example, in photography, an unnecessary or nonstandard element in
Sarony's portraitu was the confrontational pose and frontal lighting to complement and enhance Oscar Wild's personality. Filtration serves "the purpose of defining the scope of plaintiffs copyright."251 Elements dictated by efficiency or by external factors are
not copyrightable. As for the court's role in construing the claims,
Markman v. Westview Instuments, Inc.25 2 recently affirmed this filtration process is a matter law for the court, rather than for the
jury.s2 The Third Step, Comparison, completes the copying test for
248. The utilitarian doctrine begins with Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879), holding that

processes per se are not protectible under copyright law

and further, identifying aspects of a work which "must necessarily be used as
incident to' the idea, system or process" from other aspects that are not unavoidable but instead creative selections and organization of steps and elements that make the process perform a unique function. Id. at 104. Baker
found no difference between visual or written instructions.

"[Ililustrations

are the mere language employed by the author to convey his ideas more
clearly." Id. at 103. The Three-Step test was adopted in the Second Circuit in
ComputerAssociates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
249. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236
(3d Cir. 1986).
250. BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 241, at 49.

251. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1476 (9th Cir.
1992).
252. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
253. To assist in this inquiry the court may appoint its own independent expert under FED. R. EVID. 706. See Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys., Inc.,
925 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating "[T]he filtration analysis is a
matter of law for the [clourt," analogizing Markman in patent law to copyright
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nonliteral elements. Step Three is the familiar Substantial Similarity test, testing for copying copyrightable elements at the "core
of expression "2' and at the 'heart' of the work with respect to their
degree of importance.
A filtration statement applying the Three-Step test for nonliteral elements in Sarony's portrait of Oscar Wilde, obtains information far more relevant to its function. Briefly, in summary
form, with a few examples of items to consider: Step One, Abstraction: 1) the frame: framing the image sets the rules and
grammatical relations within. 2) the objects: positioning the objects, planes, and lines sets the syntax (rhythm, mood, tone); Step
Two, Filtration; as dictated by efficiency, would eliminate commercial prints unless they were made under the artist's direct supervision; as dictated by external factors, would eliminate such
factors as formulaic lighting, items of clothing and furniture designs; Step Three, Comparison, would raise questions such as: Can
the image function the same or communicate the same message in
color? with a round or square frame? without selective burning
and dodging? without the confrontational pose and frontal lighting? without the same shadows and highlights? A three-step
analysis results in filtering out noncopyrightable elements, but
fully protects the intangible creative elements of the image in its
"selection coordination and arrangement" 55 of the elements, as well
as certain processes employed to produce a print from the original
negative image.
CONCLUSION
When each of the post-Feist decisions is taken to its logical
conclusion, set against a backdrop of idea-fact/expression dichotomy, it renders copyright law next to useless for protecting creative aspects of intellectual property. No distinction is being drawn
between "Writings and Discoveries" by "Authors and Inventors"
and all other repetitive works drawn from common knowledge.
Photography has seen the evolution of scientific advancement
with the onset of digital-imaging technology. 2" Digital-imaging
law).
254. Computer Assocs. Intl, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir.
1992).

255. Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362
(1991).
256. See generally William J. Mitchell, When Is Seeing Believing? - Digital
Technology for Manipulating Images has Subverted the Certainty of Photo-

graphic Evidence, SCI. AM., February 1994, at 68; Bennett Daviss, Picture Perfect - The Latest Computer Technology is Spreadinga New Visual Medium - The
Perfect Faked Photo - So Fast It's Making the Experts Uneasy, DISCOVER, July
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technology can generate digital composites from existing photographs, improving on the author's combination of elements, and in
doing so, receive copyright protection, the equivalent of a productby-process patent. Clearly, the courts' focus on objects photographed, literally, opened the way for such appropriations of another's creation, as just innocent recombinations of public facts.
The Three-Step test for copying would set the scope of the copyrightable material, both literal and nonliteral, and eliminate
wholesale appropriations as such."7
Under the present reading of the law, once an artist's discoveries are published, they become unprotected with respect to controlling the first

copy.2

Will the courts permit competing com-

mercial interests to successfully argue under the Fair Use
doctrine, similar to the reverse doctrine of equivalents from patent
law,m that their technology made the images more appealing and
more accessible; thereby, better satisfying the public interest?
Such appropriation would be rewarded, while the original work
would receive nothing.
On the other hand, will copyright owners in the absence of
specifications be permitted to expand their rights beyond the intended purpose of their work? Even when specifications are prescribed, as under the doctrine of equivalents in patent law, 60 Justice Douglas, dissenting in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co. concluded,
[M]oreover, a doctrine [of equivalents] which is said to protect
against practicing 'a fraud on a patent' is used to extend a patent to
a composition which could not be patented ....Thus we end with a

strange anomaly: a monopoly is obtained on an unpatented and un-

1990, at 85.
257. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir.
1980).
258. See generally Mathieson v. Associated Press, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1685, 1689
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)..
259. A patent extends to the function of a device only in a particular way, as
different inventions can do the same thing. Known as the Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents in patent law, it acknowledges that "one may only appear to have
appropriated the patented contribution, when a product precisely described in a
patent claim is in fact 'so far changed in principle' that it performs a
'substantially different way' and is not therefore an appropriation. " SRI Intl v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
260. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
608-10 (1950) (reviewing the theory of the doctrine of equivalents). "[Ihf two
devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in
name, form or shape." Id. at 608.
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patentable article.26'
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Lee v. Runge asked, in support
of denying copyright for a compilation of public information,
"[w]here ... a writer has published a book which compiles and
applies information available to all men, should that writer have a
monopoly on the ideas in that book through a copyright, issued
merely because the words used were the author's own?""2 Justice
Douglas defines "ideas" here as pre-existing general knowledge, or
widely known facts, like the white pages in Feist. A creative,
original product, on the other hand, would communicate something that was not known before, either through original research
or through intangible means in its selection, coordination and arrangement of pre-existing facts.
Photography, same as sculpture, painting, writing, and other
intellectual property, has its commercial side. The difference between commercial work and art lies, for the most part, in the
originator's purpose and the intended use of the work. The sample
of courts discussed in this Article focused on property rights of the
owner of the product created by equating fixed expression to expression and failed to acknowledge different goals in artistic expression from those of commercial work.
The basics of proving copyright infringement, ownership of
the copyright and that another copied illicitly, are becoming more
and more difficult to prove as the boundary between private personal achievement and public domain becomes ever less well defined. The solution for keeping copyright protection viable for art
may rest in the constitutional mandate and the issuance of copyrights to individuals who can show in a filtration statement the intellectual, creative and original part of their claim to intellectual
property, as the benefit to be derived by the public. Otherwise, today's literal reading of copyrighted works tends to discourage
creative or theoretical expression for the public use, the exact opposite of the constitutional mandate for which it was intended to
fulfill.

261. Id. at 618 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
262. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890-91 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Table 1. Competing Factors in Copyright Protection for
Photography*
Copyright

Kind

Purpose

Ownership of Copyright

Art Work

Personal Work

Photographer Owns

Curtis*

Alt*
Curtis*

Alt*
Curtis*
Rogers*

Studio
Set -Up

CommissionedDocumentary

Subject Owns

Alt*
Davidov*

Rogers*
Caratzas

Protection

Most

Rogers*?
Mathieson?

Rogers*

On-Site

Least

Epic Metals*
Mathieson
Caratzas

CommissionedAdvertising
Epic Metals*
Mathieson
Davidov*

Publisher Owns
Epic Metals*
Mathieson
Davidov*
Caratzas

* Opinion favorable to plaintiff.

? Indicates absence of information about any contract between
the commissioning party and the photographers. Under 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) (work for hire) unless otherwise provided for in a contract, copyright is owned by the commissioning party.

